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CRIMINAL LAW REVISION
CODIFICATION VS. PIECEMEAL AMENDMENT
Frank J. Remington*
I. Introduction
This symposium issue of the Nebraska Law Review affords addi-
tional evidence of the growing interest in criminal law revision. Not
only is there interest, but, more important, there are indications that
steps are being taken to translate that interest into tangible contribu-
tions to the improvement of criminal justice, and particularly toward
the improvement of the substantive criminal law which has for so
long been ignored.1 It is with revision of the substantive statutory law
that this article is primarily concerned.
Louisiana completed a thorough revision of its substantive statutes
in 1942 and it is significant that one of the authors of that revision is
able to state more than ten years later:
... the advantages of a simple, well defined body of substantive criminal
laws are now fully recognized by the bench and bar.2
Efforts are being made elsewhere. A model penal code is currently
being prepared by the American Law Institute.3 A complete revision
of the substantive criminal statutes was presented to the 1953 session
of the Wisconsin legislature. Although the question of adoption was
postponed, the legislature ordered the proposal printed in the 1953
statutes to insure wide circulation and also designated an advisory
committee of members of the bench and bar to continue the study.4
Revision is currently underway in Missouri,5 New Hampshire,6 New
* Associate Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Wisconsin.
If the current interest continues we may hope soon to approach the goal
described by Dean Roscoe Pound when he said: "Until the criminal law is
studied as zealously and scientifically and is regarded by teachers, students,
lawyers and judges as being worthy of their best and most intelligent efforts
as is the civil side of the law, the administration of criminal justice will
continue to fall short of public expectation."
Bennett, Louisiana's Criminal Code of 1942, 20 Kan. City L. Rev. 208, 220
(1952). Also see Smith, How Louisiana Prepared and Adopted a Criminal
Code, 41 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 125 (1950), in which the author concludes
by saying: "Under the criminal code of 1942 criminal law administration in
Louisiana has been greatly improved. Instead of being productive of confusion
as was claimed it has done much to simplify; instead of creating uncertainty
it has brought assurance; and the envisioned difficulties of adjusting to a
new system have not materialized."
8 For a detailed description of the project, see Wechsler, The Challenge of
a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1097 (1952).
'Wis. Stat. c. 623 (1953).
'See 20 Kan. City L. Rev. 197-204 (1952), where Richard J. Chamier,
Chairman of the Criminal Law Revision Committee of the Missouri Senate, and
William R. Nelson, Director of Research, outline the scope of the Missouri
revision.
0 Report of the New Hampshire Legislative Council 9 (Dec., 1952): "The
criminal statutes of New Hampshire are demonstrably in need of revision
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Mexico 7 and Maryland. In addition there is evidence of current
interest elsewhere.9
The scope and nature of these revisions differ widely. Some, such
as the revision in Louisiana and the proposed revision in Wisconsin,
involve a redrafting of the entire substantive criminal law. Others,
such as the current revision in Mlissouri, involve the study of specific
aspects of the substantive criminal law with the results submitted to
the legislature in the form of separate bills. Whatever the form, cur-
rent efforts toward revision raise two basic issues upon which there
is, and undoubtedly will continue to be, substantial disagreement: (1)
Is revision of the substantive criminal statutes needed at all? (2) If
so, what form should that revision take?
II. The Need for Revision
Lawyers often put the issue in this form: "What is wrong with the
present law?" No one would argue that the prospect of an abstractly
more perfect legislative formulation justifies revision in an area that
vitally effects so many people. Revision must be justified on the basis
of real need, upon a determination that there is something basicly
wrong with present criminal statutes and that revision will result in
significant improvement in administration. This appraisal can be
made adequately only in the context of the problems of the particular
and re-organization. Many of the existing laws are inequitable and outmoded.
As a result of this condition, a joint committee... has undertaken the work
of revising the existing criminal statutes in an effort to improve our crimnial
laws both substantively and procedurally .... "
'Letter from New Mexico Legislative Council (March 23, 1953).
'Letter from Carl N. Everstene, Acting Director of Maryland Department
of Legislative Reference (March 30 ,1953).
Illinois: ".... Bar leaders said the criminal code should be the next step
to follow the judicial reorganization constitutional amendment they are back-
ing in the current session. Criminal code revision hasn't been attempted since
1937 and 1939 sessions. Preliminary work on bringing the work up to date has
been started by a Chicago Bar Association Committee." Chicago Tribune,
Feb. 5, 1953.
Kansas: "Our Judicial Council has been doing some sporodic research look-
ing toward a revision of our criminal code, but lack of funds has limited the
work." Excerpt from letter from Walter G. Thiel, Chairman of the Kansas
Judicial Council (Sept. 7, 1951).
Puerto Rico: "... interested in drafting a new criminal code, as our code
dates back to the last century." Excerpt from letter from Carlos V. Davela,
Assistant Attorney General, Puerto Rico (Aug. 30, 1951).
10 This does not detract in the least from the value of the forthcoming Model
Penal Code of the American Law Institute. "The project should, at least, permit
the law to join with other disciplines in the production of a treatise on the
major problems of the penal law and their appropriate solutions from which
future legislation, adjudication and administration may be able to draw aid
.... The model Code itself will represent the practical embodiment of the
conclusions of the study, in the form best calculated to promote their use."
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jurisdiction where the issue is raised.' ° It requires intensive study of
the sfibstantive criminal statutes, a study of their relation to procedure
and treatment provisions and a pooling of the views of those experi-
enced in the administration of the criminal law. Only then can the
significant defects be outlined and a decision made as to whether the
difficulty caused by the defects is sufficiently great to justify the effort
and expense of adequate revision.
Generalizations based upon experience elsewhere, though not suf-
ficient, may be helpful. There are certain basic reasons for criminal
law revision which in large part explain the current interest in re-
vision and which are to a varying degree applicable to most juris-
dictions. Only the briefest attention can be given them here. They
can be fully illustrated by examples taken from almost any state.
A. Obsolescense
The substantive criminal statutes of most jurisdictions have not
been revised for 100 years. Though there is often pressure for the
passage of new laws, seldom does anyone urge the repeal of old ones.
Sections passed upwards to 100 years ago to meet specific social prob-
lems remain, although the problems have long ago ceased to be of
any real importance." They are found scattered among the important
provisions, making the use of the statutes unnecessarily difficult, mak-
ing it necessary for officials to pick and choose the laws which they
will enforce; serving no useful purpose except as a favorite topic for
the humorist, and, in general, adding little by way of dignity to the
law.2
In some situations obsolescence is not so obvious. Often the process
of judicial interpretation of a statute over a period of years results in
a statute meaning something quite different from what it seems to
say.13 Some aspects of the substantive statutory law have failed to
keep pace with administrative and procedural changes. For example,
the failure to integrate the substantive law with changes in the law
relating to parole has frequently resulted in minimum penalties being
of little effect and serving only to mislead.
Advances in scientific knowledge have made some substantive rules
outmoded. The "year and a day rule" made sense at a time when a
" See Wis. Stat. § 340.76 (1951): "No person shall cause any steam engine
to be propelled or hauled upon or over any highway in the nightime ......
"See Baker, Legislative Crimes, 23 Minn. L. Rev. 135 (1939). The article
contains many illustrations of outmoded legislative enactments. In many fields
of law an article written some 14 years ago would now be out of date. Un-
fortunately Mr. Baker's article is still very much in date.
1 See Wis. Stat. § 340.02 (1947): "Such killing, when perpetrated from
premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed...." In State v.
Hogan, 36 Wis. 226 (1874), the Court stated: "We take the 'premeditated
design' of our murder in the first degree to be simply an intent to kill."
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doctor was unable accurately to trace the chain of causation for a
longer period of time. Medical science has progressed to a point today
where the rule has lost its reason for being.
B. Needless Verbosity
Many criminal statutes are unnecessarily verbose. The result is
that they are difficult to read and uncertain in their application.
Statutes dealing with criminal damage to property and theft tradition-
ally contain long lists of words attempting to specifically describe every
conceivable type of property which may be damaged or stolen.14 If
the result were certainty in the meaning of the statutes, the verbosity
might be justified. Quite the contrary is true. Recently a person punc-
tured eggs, drained off their contents and then filled the shells with
white paint. These were taken to an outdoor movie and during the
show thrown at the screen which was considerably damaged. The
jurisdiction in which the case arose had a long statute on criminal
damage which enumerated in detail almost every conceivable type of
tangible property. But, since movie screens are of relatively recent
origin, they were not listed. Long investigation by the district at-
torney and consultation with the attorney general finally afforded an
answer to the problem. It happens that the movie screen had a door
behind which was a small closet. This made it a building and since
buildings are specifically enumerated in the statutes a violation was
proved. This demonstrates neither certainty of meaning nor efficiency
in administration. We have long since reached the point where the
subject matter of both criminal damage and theft is capable of brief,
accurate, and sensible definition.
C. Needless Distinctions
No lawyer needs to be told of the difficulty and uncertainty which
results from the distinctions between larceny, embezzlement and false
pretenses. If these distinctions separated criminal from non-criminal
behavior, their retention would be warranted. Instead their existence
is explainable almost entirely on the basis of historical development.15
The confusion created serves no useful purpose and can be eliminated
by consolidation. 6 Nor is the problem confined to the theft offenses.
In one jurisdiction, where the arson statutes distinguish between the
burning of a dwelling and the burning of other buildings, 7 a
defendant set fire to a hotel. Much time and effort was devoted to the
question of whether the hotel was a "dwelling." Since the manager
permanently resided in one of the rooms, it was held that it was.
" See Wis. Stat. § 343.44 (1951).
" See Hall, Theft Law and Society (2d ed. 1952).
" Stumberg, Sources of Confusion in Crimes Involving Property, 10 Texas
B. J. 100, 118 (1947).
"Wis. Stat. §§ 343.01, 343.02 (1951).
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Where statutory distinctions are based upon substantial differences
in the nature of the conduct involved, a useful purpose is served. But,
to the extent that distinctions are drawn between substantially similar
conduct, the time and effort devoted to drawing the distinctions are
wasted.
D. Neediess Overlapping
In some jurisdictions there is almost exact duplication between two
or more statutes. Often two statutes will prescribe different penalities
for exactly the same conduct, with the fate of the defendant dependent
upon the accident of which one is chosen by the prosecutor. In some
instances, despite the fact that there is a general provision applicable
to all sections, the substance of the general provision is specifically
repeated in some specific sections but not in others. For example, in
Nebraska the section on horse stealing' s contains a clause prohibiting
the harboring of a horse thief. The first degree murder section 19 con-
tains no such clause, reliance being placed upon the general pro-
visions on harboring.20 The result is that the offense of harboring a
horse thief carries a maximum penalty of ten years, while the maxi-
mum for harboring a first degree murderer is two years.
Duplication may be justified where there is a basis for penalty
variation; e.g., where a specific statement serves an educational pur-
pose, such as a specific prohibition against smoking in bed which can
be posted in hotel rooms; and, where the offense occurs so frequently
that a specific statute contributes to facility of administration. 2' But,
haphazard duplication contributes nothing except confusion.
E. Inadequate Siatement
Many statutes do little more than indicate the range of penalties,
requiring resort to the common law in order to determine their
meaning.22 Many important doctrines, such as defenses to crime, are
either inadequately defined or not defined at all in the statutes. In-
adequate statement of important aspects of the substantive criminal
law often necessitates extensive research adding unnecessarily to the
cost of both prosecution and defense. This is amply demonstrated by
the recent case of Morissette v. United States3 where an appeal to
18Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28.509 (Reissue 1948).
10Neb Rev. Stat. § 28-401 (Reissue 1948).
21 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-202 (Reissue 1948).
"1 "Bad check" statutes are in large part explainable by the frequency with
which the problem arises. In most instances, the case could be handled under
the false pretense statutes, but administrative convenience is furthered by the
use of prima facie cases, etc.
22 See Wis. Stat. § 343.31 (1951): "Any person who shall be convicted of
any gross fraud or cheat at common law shall be punished...." Also see
Wechsler, Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1097, 1100 (1952).
2- 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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the United States Supreme Court was necessary in order to determine
the mental state required by the crime of which the defendant was
convicted. Careful attention in the drafting of criminal statutes to in-
sure that the basis of criminal liability is clearly expressed would do
much to obviate this difficulty.24
F. Needless Penalty Variations
In some jurisdictions there has been almost a legislative mania for
setting up an infinite number of classifications for penalty purposes.
In one, there are six classifications of larceny within one section; six
sections dealing with murder and thirteen sections dealing with man-
slaughter.25 The differences between some of the sections are incon-
sequential and yet the prosecutor is put to the trouble of making a
correct choice; the judge, to the trouble of deciding which must be
submitted; and the trier of fact, to the trouble of making a determina-
tion of fact which too often has no bearing upon the seriousness of
the defendant's conduct. This is not to say that the legislature cannot
properly indicate a range of permissible penalties. It would seem
obvious, however, that penalty variations ought to be based upon
significant differences in the nature of the conduct which is prohibited.
Obsolete statutes, the discrepancy between statutory language and
judicial interpretation, the wide disparity between the "law" on the
books" and the "law in action," needless verbosity distinctions and
duplication, inadequate statement, and inconsistent and irrational
penalty variation, all contribute to confusion and difficulty in ad-
ministration. All of these defects may not be found in a particular
jurisdiction. Their occurrence is frequent enough, however, to war-
rant giving serious consideration to revision in most states.
It is no answer that this complexity has become familiar to those
experienced in the criminal law. Education in the unnecessary in-
tricacies of the present substantive law takes time and expense which
is unwarranted whether borne by the state, the client, or the lawyer
himself.26 Efficiency of administration which would result from a
rational, consistent and clearly expressed criminal law ought to result
in a saving to both the state and the defendant. Nowhere is adequate
legal assistance at minimum cost needed more than in the field of
criminal law.
-4 For a full discussion of the Morissette case and the problem of adequate
formulation of the requisite mental state, see Remington and Helstad, The
Mental Element in Crime-A Legislative Problem, [1952] Wis. L. Rev. 644.
25 Wis. Stat. cc. 340, 343 (1951).
-1 The more the practice of law becomes diversified, the more important
it is that statutory formulations adequately set forth the basis of liability.
To the extent that statutes are clear and sufficiently comprehensive, the non-
specialist can render adequate service without the expenditure of an exorbitant
amount of his time.
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This is not to say that we have not been getting along relatively
well in most jurisdictions. To the extent that we have, it is a tribute
to good administration which has achieved a measure of success despite
an unnecessarily complex substantive law.
III. Form of Revision
There are numerous approaches to the problem of criminal law
revision. Three basically different methods will be briefly discussed
here: (1) Piecemeal amendment. (2) Mechanical redrafting of all exist-
ing criminal statutes. (3) Codification. No one of the alternatives is
necessarily the right one. Each has some merit. The choice must be
made finally by the individual jurisdiction in the context of the prob-
lems it seeks to solve by revision. Nonetheless, some generalization is
possible.
A. Piecemeal Amendment
This involves the repeal of certain sections, the amendment of
others, perhaps the enactment of a few new ones. Emphasis is upon
the most obvious defects with the least possible disturbance to other
criminal statutes. It is the traditional method of revision in the
criminal law.
The argument in support of the piecemeal approach to revision is
largely one of political theory. "Any changes in the criminal law
should be presented individually so that every legislator knows exactly
what he is doing to the basic rights of citizens as human beings. If
changes are not made in this way, everyone has reason for alarm."2 7
As a practical matter, it is true that the piecemeal approach is the
only method of revision which insures that each legislator will be able,
with a minimum of effort, to understand the nature of the legislation
before him. Total revision covers a large amount of the substantive
criminal law. The result is a bill so large and so complex that few
legislators have the time, interest, or ability to understand and evaluate
its merits. Legislative debate is, therefore, confined to generalities.28
This view reflects a lack of confidence in the committee system.
Interim legislative committees or legislative councils in charge of the
research necessary for complete revision are looked upon with sus-
picion. It is claimed that the only safeguard against ill-conceived leg-
islation is to have each specific change individually debated on its
merits before the entire legislature. Proponents of this view may con-
cede the efficacy of total revision in other fields, corporation law for
example, but deny that methods, suitable elsewhere, should be used
2" From a document submitted to the 1953 session of the Wisconsin Legis-
lature in opposition to the Proposed Criminal Code.
"For example: "This is a prosecution bill;" "It is dictatorial in concept;"
"It is the academic aproach."
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in the field of the criminal law where people's liberty is so vitally in-
volved.
The argument in opposition to the piecemeal approach is easily
,demonstrated by a study of the present criminal statutes in most juris-
dictions. Whatever the merits on grounds of political theory, one
-hundred years of piecemeal revision has left the criminal statutes
lacking any coherent plan and subject to the defects which have pre-
viously been discussed. The remarks of Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking
for the United States Supreme Court,29 when called upon to change
a single rule of evidence is pertinent here:
But the task of modernizing the longstanding rules on the subject
is one of magnitude and difficulty which even those dedicated to law
reform do not lightly undertake .... To pull one misshapen stone out
of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its present
balance.., than to establish a rational edifice.
Apart from the merits, practical considerations within a juris-
diction may lead to the adoption of the piecemeal approach. One of
the reasons why thorough revision has been infrequent in the past is
because it is difficult. It takes time and costs money. This apparently
explains the decision in Missouri to study a few specific problems at a
time. While recognizing the need for complete revision ".. .to achieve
modernization, to eliminate conflicting and obsolete provisions and to
mrake for more uniformity... ," the Missouri committee decided that
the pressure of an imminent deadline precluded the careful and
thorough study which is necessary for overall revision.30
B. Redzafting of Existing Statutes
This contemplates a mechanical revision of the entire substantive
criminal law including the redrafting of the statutes to eliminate in-
consistent use of terminology, verbosity, needless distinction, and
duplication between sections, and, perhaps, to reorganize the statutes
according to a more sensible classification. The objective is to moder-
nize, simplify, and clarify the language of existing statutes. Change,
whether it be the enacting of new statutes, the repeal of old ones, or
the codification of existing case law in areas untouched by existing
statutes, is to be avoided. Though the drafting style is new, the exist-
ing structure of the statutes remains intact.
The argument in favor of this approach is one of practical politics.
Both legislators and lawyers can be assured that the product is the
same as the one with which they are familiar. Moreover, legislators
in most jurisdictions are accustomed to this type of revision and there-
fore will view it without the fear that generally accompnies innova-
tion. The size and complexity of the bill are minimized by assurances
2
_ Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
30 20 Kan. City L. Rev. 197-204 (1952).
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that no changes are made. If change in substance is needed, that
change will have to be made in the form of separate bills each subject
to full legislative debate.
The disadvantages of this method of revision are twofold: (1) To
the extent that existing legislation suffers from a failure to reflect im-
portant doctrines, such as those dealing with responsibility, justifica-
tion and excuse; from substantive inconsistencies between various
sections dealing with essentially the same type of conduct; and from
needless penalty variation, mere mechanical revision of existing
statutes is plainly inadequate. (2) The second difficulty comes when
the job is attempted. There may be merit in the position that revision
should accomplish simplicity and clarity of statement without any
change in the substance of the law. It certainly is the answer if the
only problem is inadequate draftsmanship. But if the confusion and
complexity results in large part from substantive inconsistency, re-
drafting alone cannot accomplish clarity in the statutes. This can be
illustrated by examples:
(a) Assume an unnecessarily verbose statute which specifically enu-
merates each type of property which can be damaged or stolen. The
list of items is so complete that a general definition of the term
"property" is feasible and would contribute to clarity. Would this type
of redrafting be consistent with mechanical revision? It can be said that
the general definition does not significantly extend criminal liability.
It cannot be said that no change at all is involved and any representa-
tion to that effect to the legislature is misleading.
(b) Assume that consolidation of the theft offenses is contemplated.
Since in larceny an intent to return is a defense while in embezzle-
ment it is not a defense, consolidation of the two is impossible without
making some change.
(c) Assume that consolidation of various arson or burglary statutes
is contemplated. Since each existing statute carries a penalty different
from the others, consolidation is impossible without effecting a change
in penalty.
There are illustrative only. The proposals embodied in the three
examples given are modest in scope. The fact that they cannot be
accomplished in the form of a strictly mechanical revision indicates
the severe limitations of this approach to the problem.
C. Codffication
Codification is the attempt to state enough of the substantive law
in statutory form to give a reasonably adequate picture of its scope and
the details of its provisions without extended reference to the case law.
Two things are necessary.8 1
11 See Wechsler, Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1097
(1952).
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(1) The standards of conduct must be stated fully and in clear and
concise terms. It is not enough to incorporate common law crimes by
reference. Nor is it enough to indicate the basis of liability by un-
defined terms such as "willful," "wanton," or "unlawful."32 Con-
sistency of purpose and consistency in the use of terminology is re-
quired. Consistency of purpose makes it necessary to make the sub-
stantive law internally consistent and in conformity with the pro-
cedural and treatment provisions of the jurisdiction. Consistency in
the use of terminology makes it neecssary to use words of precise
meaning, defining them if necessary, and to use them uniformly
throughout the code.
Substantive change in the law is not the primary objective. But,
if in the elimination of needless verbosity, distinctions and duplication,
the elimination of irrational penalty variations and the consolidation
of offenses, changes are necessary to accomplish the objective of a clear,
concise and consistent code, those changes should be made.
(2) Considerable attention must be given to fundamental concepts
such as mental state, justification, mitigating factors, complicity and
other doctrines which are largely ignored in present statutory formu-
lation. This requires a codification of existing case law. In those areas
where the court of the jurisdiction has not faced the problem, the
statutory draft will be based upon experience elsewhere.3 3 Once again
substantive change, though not the objective of codification, is not to
be avoided where change is necessary to accomplish consistency of
purpose and adequate formulation of the basic doctrines of the
criminal law.
Where change in policy is necessary or desirable in the process of
codification, the issue involved ought to be squarely presented to
the legislative committee and the advisory committee supervising
the project. The possibility of complete debate before the legislature
is limited for reasons to which reference has already been made.
Success in codification requires legislative confidence in the integrity
and ability of those engaged in the study. For that reason the active
participation of experienced members of the legislature, bench, and
bar is highly desirable.34
"_ For a discussion of the difficulties such terms create, see Remington and
Helstad, The Mental Element in Crime-A Legislative Problem, [1952] Wis.
L. Rev. 644.
" In some areas, lack of sufficient knowledge or experience may preclude
concise statutory formulation. Those areas, where judicial development is to
be encouraged, should be explicitly recognized and designated.
1 It is also desirable to start with reformulation of familiar concepts.
Formulation of doctrines, such as those relating to justification, responsibility,
etc., will be regarded as innovations and should be postponed until confidence
in the project is created.
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The argument in favor of codification is that it is the only method
of accomplishing the task at hand. Dean Albert J. Harno, respected
both for his scholarship and his experience in statutory revision, has
stated the need in these terms: 35
There is a clear public reaction against the plethora of laws ... reasons
for codification also are real and they are urgent. Anglo-American crim-
inal law has nowhere in it evidence of plan or design. That is its out-
standing weakness. A great mass of judge-made law containing a mingl-
ing of ancient precedents, outgrown formulas, traditional beliefs, and
some forward-looking expressions, supplementel by a large number of
statutory provisions, constitutes the framework of the criminal law. A
unity of aim is needed, and codification, when it comes, should be erected
on that foundation.
The argument against codification is reflected in the following
quotations taken from a statement submitted in opposition to the
Proposed Criminal Code for Wisconsin:
... a code is handed down from one or a group of master lawmakers,
while the American concept is that criminal laws originate with the
people. The various needs of the people are generally reflected in the
separate criminal statutes passed by the legislators.
There is an extremely serious question involved in the propriety of
changing substantive criminal law by a single massive code. Under the
American system of jurisprudence, every crime is independent of every
other one;... a code, on the other hand, is a legal unit containing all
of the law on a given subject. Every section refers and relates to every
other section, and must be interpreted in the light of every other section.
Thus, the whole code is interlaced and interlocked, so as to effectuate
a single presumptive legislative intent.30
Some of the statements, such as the claim that every section of a
code must be read in relation to every other one, are obviously not
true. Yet the fear of codification is held by a sufficient number of law-
yers to make their objections worthy of serious consideration.
Although codification is not possible without making some change
in the law, it does not necessarily involve a fundamental reorientation
of the basic policy of the criminal law. If fundamental change is
desirable that change may, of course, be accomplished in the process
of codification. Fundamental change in policy raises problems beyond
the scope of this article. It has nowhere been attempted in this
country. There is serious doubt whether present knowledge of human
behavior affords a sufficient basis for a basic reorientation of the
"Harno, Some Significant Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure
in the Last Century, 42 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 427, 456 (1951).36 The claim that codification will also increase the number of appeals is
frequently made. This proved not to be true in Louisiana. Smith, How Louis-
iana Prepared and Adopted a Criminal Code, 41 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
125, 135 (1950).
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substantive criminal law. Nonetheless codification now ought not to
freeze the status quo.3 7 Fundamental reorientation, when and if a
concensus as to the desirable direction for change is reached, should
not be foreclosed.
CONCLUSION
The inadequacies of the substantive, statutory criminal law reflect
the fact that it is a comparatively neglected area of the law. The
need for revision is real. Yet the problems which revision presents
are not easily solved. They deserve the attention of all who have
an interest in the administration of the criminal law. Their solution
will more than compensate for the time and effort involved.
17 See Wechsler, Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1097,
1132 (1952).
